A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for post-graduate and advanced undergraduate students of Economics, emphasizing the theory’s foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It also includes over 100 exercises.

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein have made most of their theoretical contributions on the strategic side, and yet they devote a nice portion of the book to cooperative game theory. I recommend this book highly. It is beautifully done, and it recognizes the importance of the cooperative theory.”

—Robert J. Aumann,
Professor of Mathematics,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Preface.

1. Introduction.

I. Strategic Games—2. Nash Equilibrium. 3. Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium. 4. Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions. 5. Knowledge and Equilibrium.

II. Extensive Games with Perfect InformatIon—6. Extensive Games with Perfect Information. 7. Bargaining Games. 8. Repeated Games. 9. Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games. 10. Implementation Theory.

III Extensive Games with Imperfect Information—11. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information. 12. Sequential Equilibrium.

IV Coalitional Games—13. The Core. 14. Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value. 15. The Nash Solution.

List of Results. References. Index